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Abstract—This paper presents a critical analysis and statistical 
evaluation of two categories of Physically Unclonable Functions 
(PUFs): ring oscillator PUF and a new proposed adapted latch 
based PUF. The main contribution is that of measuring the 
properties of PUF which provide the basic information for using 
them in security applications. The original method involved the 
conceptual design of adapted latch based PUFs and ring 
oscillator PUFs in combination with peripheral devices in order 
to create an environment for experimental analysis of PUF 
properties. Implementation, testing and analysis of results 
followed. This approach has applications on high level security.  
Index Terms—FPGA, security, physical unclonable function, 
temperature, ring oscillator, latch 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N the past two decades, advances in programmable device
technologies, both hardware and software areas, have been
extraordinary [7]. The original application to rapid 
prototyping in a large number of areas such as: medical 
apparatus, automotive industry, industrial control systems, 
remote sensing, data complex computations, or robotics has 
been complemented with a large number of new applications 
in the security domain [8 9 10]. New security methods are 
based on PUFs (Physically Unclonable Functions). A mutual 
authentication scheme between the FPGA chip manufacturers 
and the IP providers is presented in [13]. In [21] the authors 
described a method for Authentication via CRP (Challenge-
Response Pairs). PUFs can be also used to extract chip-unique 
signature and volatile secret keys which can be used in 
cryptographic protocols or authentication schemes. An 
overview of the most important implementation details and 
experimental results for the PUFs is presented in [1, 12]. An 
important analysis regarding the techniques for design and 
implementation of an FPGA PUF circuit is presented in [11]. 
The present paper describes the implementation details and 
experimental analysis and results regarding a ring oscillator 
PUF(a delay based PUF) and an adapted Latch based PUF(a 
memory based PUF) to fulfill an FPGA practical approach. 
Two PUF circuits suitable for an FPGA implementation, 
described in the literature, are: SRAM PUF and PDL PUF.
Experiments regarding the SRAM PUF are presented in [1] 
but this PUF suffers from two main drawbacks: i) the SRAM 
PUF is not available on all mainstream FPGA platforms 
(because no uninitialized SRAM is available on most types) 
[23]; nowadays, most of the FPGA manufacturers reset the 
start-up state of the SRAM cells to a known value, rendering 
the SRAM-PUF difficult to be used [17, 18]; ii) the response 
of the SRAM PUF is generated only on the power-up state of
the circuit, the output of the PUF circuit could not be re-
generated while the circuit is operational [16]. The authors of 
[17] attempt to remove the fundamental obstacle Xilinx 
FPGAs have – from the SRAM-PUF point of view - by using a 
work-around that enables to disconnect uninstantiated BRAM 
from the power supply network. The complex mechanism is 
based on 3 partial reconfigurations and the results regarding 
the uniqueness are not successful. As an alternative to SRAM 
PUF, memory based PUFs that use the basic principle of 
SRAM PUF started to appear: SR Latch PUF, D Flip-Flop 
PUF, Butterfly PUF or Buskeeper PUF cell [1]. All of these 
require careful routing in order to be implemented on FPGA. 
For FPGA, programming is done through logic blocks and 
interconnects; the gate level structure cannot be accessed, in 
order to exploit layout design techniques.  
Programmable delay lines (PDLs) are introduced in [19] in 
order to accurately equalize the signal arrival times to flip-
flop. PUF circuits based on identical and symmetrical 
interconnections may use PDLs in order to adjust their values 
of propagation times. In [20], the authors use PDL to cancel 
out delay skews caused by asymmetries in routing and 
systematic variations for an Arbiter PUF.  Their mechanism of 
adjusting delays is complex and requires a non-negligible 
effort to implement in practice. In the present work, the efforts 
were focused on trying to find out identical or slightly 
different interconnections. This paper presents the 
experimental results obtained by considering the interconnects 
inside PUFs slightly differently. The PDLs are a novel 
mechanism that may help constructing PUFs when the 
identical or slightly different interconnections could not be 
achieved. In this work, the correct timing was accomplished 
without PDLs. 
According to [1], there are two delay based PUFs: the 
Arbiter PUF and the Ring Oscillator PUF. There are some 
differences between the presented implementation and testing 
approach and other experiments, which are described briefly 
below. The Ring Oscillator circuit is analyzed in this paper on 
two different FPGA families: Spartan 3E and Spartan 6. The 
Spartan 3E was released in 2004, on 90-nanometer copper 
process technology [15]. The Spartan 6 is built in 2009, on a
45-nanometer, 9-metal layer and dual-oxide process 
technology [14]. Besides other experiments, details of 
implementation and measurements of propagation times 
through gates and interconnections are presented for these two 
FPGA families. There are differences in FPGA architectures 
between families and the results presented in this paper show 
that PUF circuits may be implemented despite architecture
differences; moreover, the uniqueness and reliability properties 
are not affected by those differences. 
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moreover, the uniqueness and reliability properties are not 
affected by those differences. The random level of the PUF 
responses, and by default the uniqueness property, is increased 
due to differences in the FPGA family architecture. Also, the 
properties of PUF circuits are analyzed along IP cores and 
digital circuits with different complexities because one of the 
main applications is to protect critical information acquired 
and processed in complex System-on-Chips implemented on 
FPGAs using the generated PUF based secret key. Even if the 
RO PUF is designed and implemented as a hard macro, and 
when duplicated all routing and logic resources will remain 
identical, the other digital components used to obtain the 
response of the PUF circuits (e.g. counters) are placed and 
routed by the synthesis tool. These changes may be reflected in 
the reliability of RO PUF circuits. The paper also explains how 
the digital circuit activity can influence the RO PUF responses. 
The internal activities of the circuits produce delay variations 
(nano-variations) through gates and interconnections between 
gates. The process variations also affect the electrical 
parameters of logical gates and interconnections and by default 
the delays are affected by the internal activities. The paper 
shows that the uniqueness property of PUF circuits is obtained 
through both types of variations and analyzes how the 
reliability property responds to both types of variations.  
The latch based PUF is not widely researched. Due to its 
requirements of symmetry, it is difficult to implement it on 
FPGA devices. There are few results in the research literature 
regarding the latch based PUFs implemented on FPGAs. In 
[5], a design and implementation of a true random generator is 
presented, which exploits the metastability of the RS latch for 
an FPGA device. In [6], the authors introduced a novel 
structure with random latches for generating high-entropy 
responses using randomness. The article mentioned above [6] 
does not include implementation details; therefore, it is 
unclear how the identical and symmetrical interconnections 
are obtained. The aim of the present paper is to implement and 
evaluate another possible PUF circuit appropriate for different 
FPGA architectures. After an exhaustive analysis of PUF 
results presented in dedicated literature and after many 
attempts to obtain symmetrical and identical routes using the 
Xilinx FPGA Editor, it has been concluded that another good 
candidate for FPGA PUF is a circuit with minimum 
requirements of identical interconnects. The paper presents the 
possibilities to obtain interconnections between logic blocks, 
with related propagation times, and use them in order to 
construct a latch based PUF circuit.   
PUFs are also susceptible to temporal variations such as 
changes in voltage, temperature and silicon aging, which 
makes it difficult to reliably produce the correct PUF output at 
all times. Circuit operation also induces power supply voltage
variations, namely power supply noise [2]. When an input 
pattern signal is applied to a circuit, it will generate a large 
number of switches in the circuit. These will increase the 
dynamic power consumption, causing a voltage drop on power 
lines and a voltage increase on ground lines. This effect is 
known as power supply noise. Temperature distribution also 
depends on the location of the switches [3]. Even by applying
the same signal patterns to the inputs of the same digital circuit 
implemented on different chips, it will induce different 
temperature and voltage drops.  
This paper presents a conceptual design and a statistical 
analysis of two PUF circuits using 30 identical Spartan 3E 
Starter Boards and a Spartan 6 board. An experimental 
environment (test bed) is conceptually designed and 
implemented in order to analyze how much the PUF answer 
reproducibility is influenced by the running SoC (System on 
Chip) or by the complexity of the RTL (Register Transfer 
Level) design. In order to implement the protective method 
based on PUFs for FPGA applications, PUF circuits must be 
placed and routed on the unused hardware resources, near the 
complex logic which implements the entire system. Thus, this 
paper also focuses on how the digital circuit activity can 
influence the PUF responses, because one of the main 
applications is to protect critical information that is acquired 
and processed in complex SoCs implemented on FPGAs using 
the generated PUF based secret key. 
The original contributions to knowledge presented in this 
paper can be summarized as consisting of the following: i) the 
method for obtaining identical and symmetrical routes in order 
to construct a PUF circuit on two different FPGA architectures 
without programmable delay lines; ii) a novel mechanism 
making the latch based PUF a good candidate for FPGA 
implementation; iii) an environment for the experimental 
analysis of PUF properties along with analysis results; iv) an 
original theoretical perspective demonstrating that the internal 
activity of the digital system implemented on FPGA 
contributes, along the process variations, to the uniqueness 
and randomness of the PUF responses.  
II. SYSTEM CONCEPT
A new system concept for securing the FPGA System on 
Chip (SoC) is introduced. This is based on encrypted and 
authenticated communication between SoC peripherals. One 
system composed of two microprocessors and some 
peripherals may be used as example. The peripherals may be 
further classified in two domains: the first domain is 
composed of Microblaze1, RS232 controller, DRAM memory 
and cryptographic coprocessor and the second domain 
contains Microblaze2, Ethernet controller, DRAM memory 
and cryptographic coprocessor. The first domain is considered 
as the critical domain, in which data are sensitive and must be 
exchanged considering the encryption and authentication set 
of rules. Each domain has a secret key generated using PUF 
circuits. The peripherals from the same domain have access to 
the domain’s secret key and a wrapper with cryptographic 
algorithms in order to authenticate, encrypt or decrypt the
messages send or received, based on the domain’s secret key. 
The method may be also used when there is more than one 
critical domain. For each domain a distinct key, based on PUF 
circuits, must be generated. The present article analyses the 
possibility of generating distinct PUF keys on the same FPGA 
device: one for each domain. The system described before (or 
another one with more critical domains) is implemented on a
single FPGA device and each domain has a PUF secret key. So 
there may be more PUF secret keys on the same device. In 
order to use those secret keys in a security application, the 
correlation of these PUF secret keys must be analyzed. This is 
done by also measuring the uniqueness and reproducibility, by 
considering one board divided into 4 distinct parts or 4 distinct 
identical small devices. This concept may also be applied to a 
more complex system.  
III. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The method followed for the design and implementation of 
the PUF circuits and the experimental environment consists of 
3 steps: 
A. PUF Design Method using manual placement and routing 
on FPGA resources 
Two ring oscillators generate periodical signals with 
frequencies freq1 and freq2, which are connected to the clock 
input of two counters. Ideally, the freq1 and freq2 frequencies 
are identical, and therefore the two counters should reach their 
maximum value at the same time. However one of the 
counters will arrive first at the maximum value and the 
comparator’s output will be set to 1 or 0, depending on the 
process variations. Since producing a ring oscillator response 
generally involves a physical measurement, there are a number 
of unwanted physical side effects, produced by temperature or 
voltage variations, which could interfere. Due to the fact that 
adjacent FPGA locations are influenced by the similar 
environmental condition, ring oscillators placed in adjacent 
locations on the FPGA are compared. 
The ring oscillator is implemented as a hard macro and the 
gates and interconnections between them are manually placed 
and routed. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show the estimated delays 
between gates and interconnections provided by the Xilinx 
FPGA Editor. The implementation is made on Spartan 3E 
XC3S500E device and Spartan 6 XCSLX45 device. 
The ring oscillator generates a periodical signal. The 
periodically generated signal is given in (1). 
iationsprocesserconexioninvertor tptpt var_int            (1),
where inversortp is the CMOS inverter propagation delay, 
conexiunitp is the propagation delay on interconection line 
and fabricareproces_ are the process variations.  
The latch based PUF circuit is composed of a digital latch 
and a capture signal which could be the terminal counter 
signal generated by a counter when it over- or under- flows. 
Starting from the premise that interconnections between gates 
are identical and symmetrical and applying a ‘high’ active 
signal on the circuit’s input, the two outputs of the NAND 
gates will oscillate. In reality, even with the NAND gates and 
the interconnections between them manually placed and 
routed, there will be differences between the interconnections, 
and the two outputs of the NAND gates will randomly 
oscillate. On account of the FPGA routing complexity and
limitations, delay differences between the interconnections 
start to appear. The output of the latch circuit is thus biased 
because of this inconvenience. In order to obtain an 
unpredictable response from the latch, despite the delay 
differences, the two NAND outputs oscillate for a period of 
time and their values are captured in a moment specified by a 
capture signal. The oscillating period depends on how long the 
applied input is active ‘high’. The output response depends on 
the process variations due to the following: i) the signal’s 
oscillating period T depends on the propagation time of the 
NAND gates      , on the propagation time of the 
interconnect routes                and on the process variations 
 ii) the propagation time of the interconnect between the
circuit that generates the oscillating signal and the NAND 
gates is also influenced by the process variations    . iii) the 
propagation time of the interconnect between the circuit that 
generates the capture signal and the outputs of the NAND 
gates is also determined by the process variations    . The 
process variations from three distinct places       
determine the unpredictable response. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 present 
the implementation details of latch based PUF as a hard macro 
component. The gates, the flip-flops and the interconnections 
between them were manually placed and routed. Many 
attempts were made in order to achieve the optimal and 
correct timing, including tricks like the ones presented in 
PDLs but without selection. However, the propagation time 
values discussed in this paper and in other research articles are 
estimated values by the Xilinx FPGA Editor. In reality, those 
values may have slight differences.  
B. Standalone PUF ID design on FPGA device 
In order to measure the two important PUF properties, 
uniqueness and reproducibility, two cases are considered.  
In the first one, n PUF circuits at one moment are considered 
(Fig. 5a). The answer is measured and then the PUF circuits 
are relocated to other FPGA hardware configuration logic 
blocks and the measurements are repeated. There are 128 
PUFs in case of the ring oscillator circuit and 77 PUFs in case 
of the Latch based circuit for one measurement. In the second 
case, the FPGA is divided in 4 parts and 4 unique identifiers 
are considered. The FPGA may be viewed as 4 distinct 
devices (Fig. 5b). Compared with the previous scenario, the 4 
unique identifiers are placed simultaneously on the device. 
The 4 unique identifiers are each of 32-bits length.  
In both cases, the PUF answers which compute the unique 
identifier are observed using the Xilinx ChipScope Analyzer.  
The binary sequences generated using 128 Ring Oscillator 
PUFs or 77 latch based PUFs were tested using temperature 
variations. The commercial temperature range is between 0 
Celsius degree and 85 Celsius degrees while the Industrial 
temperature range is between -40 Celsius degree and 100 
Celsius degree. The FPGA device was gradually heated using 
a hairdryer in a range of temperature from 22 Celsius degree 
to 78 Celsius degree. The FPGA was also cooled to -5 Celsius
degree. The number of unreliable bits was observed in these 
conditions. Spartan 3E XC3S500E devices are used in order to 
measure the uniqueness and the reproducibility. The 
measurements are made on 30 identical devices. 
Fig. 1. RO Spartan 3E. Fig. 2. RO Spartan 6. 
Fig.3. Latch Based PUF Hard 
Macro - Spartan 3E. 
Fig. 4. Latch Based PUF Hard 
Macro - Spartan 6. 
C. PUF ID design in combination with RTL complex system 
or System on Chip on FPGA devices 
Generally a system-on-chip, which also includes security 
technology based on PUF, contains: i) the logic that 
implements the functionality of the system and ii) the PUF 
circuits and some additional logic in order to process the 
PUFs’ answer. The logic which implements the functionality 
of the system could be a larger digital system implemented in 
hardware description languages such as phone switches, 
factory controllers, large stationary installations (traffic lights) 
or systems based on microprocessors which run complex 
software/firmware programs. There are two issues that must 
be analyzed: i) if the PUF together with the complex logic of 
digital circuits, placed on FPGA hardware resources, have the 
same answers as the PUF placed on FPGA hardware resources 
without the complex logic of digital circuit ii) if the PUF 
answers remain constant (or the answer varies with certain 
limits) during the system on chip operation. In the first case, 
even if the PUF answers are not the same in both situations, 
this will not affect the security primitive based on PUF. It may 
be said that the changes contribute to the uniqueness of the 
identifier. In the second case if the answer varies with certain 
limits, with the help of an error correcting code, the security 
primitive based on PUF could be used – the reproducibility
property is not affected. Three cases are considered.
In the first case, a simple digital design is considered, 
consisting of a few binary counters. The values of the PUF 
answers may be analyzed in three scenarios: i) collecting the 
PUF answers when only PUF circuits are instantiating on 
FPGA hardware resources; ii) collecting the PUF answers 
when PUF circuits are placed and routed near counters; iii) 
placing the PUFs and the counters as in case b, except that the 
counters are inactive. 
In the second case, a complex design written in VHDL (a 
controller for a TFT touch screen) provided by Digilent Inc is 
considered. The PUF instances are placed near the TFT 
controller, as can be seen in Fig. 6. The IP cores which are 
content in the TFT controller were placed as can be seen in 
Fig. 6, using the PlanAhead software tool. The PUF answers 
are tested with and without the TFT controller, keeping the 
same hardware configuration logic blocks for PUF circuits. 
The third scenario considers a different approach based on a 
software implementation running on a build around the 
Microblaze microprocessor that runs a simple C program 
which copies the values from the switch buttons to the LEDs. 
The PUF circuits are placed as shown in Fig. 7. The PUF 
answers are tested with and without the SoC, maintaining the 
same locations for PUF circuits.  
The hardware equipment used for the experimental results 
contains an Atlys board with Spartan 6 FPGA and an LCD 
Touch Screen. The software implementation tools used are: 
Xilinx 12.1 with ISE Design Tools, FPGA Editor, Planahead 
for manual placing and routing and EDK Development Kit.  
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results obtained through the methodology presented in 
Section III are analyzed in order to conclude if the PUF 
circuits may be used in the newly introduced security 
methods.  
A. Results of PUF Design Method using manual placement 
and routing on FPGA resources 
Implementation of the ring oscillator PUF occupies entirely 
one configurable logic block with 4 and respectively 2 Slices 
on Spartan 3E and Spartan 6 devices. Two other binary 
counters and a crossing clock domain circuit are necessary in 
order to compute one ring oscillator PUF answer. This 
implementation uses 13 bits width binary counters in order to 
obtain an accurate response.  
Implementation of the latch based PUF occupies partially 
three configurable logic blocks on both Spartan 3E and 
Spartan 6. Many other configurations were tried but this one 
with 3 CLBs was chosen due to its closely related 
interconnections, as can be seen in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. One 13 
width binary counter to 15 latch based PUF circuits is needed 
in order to generate the oscillating and capture signals.  
Considering this, it can be said that the latch based PUF 
implementation is more compact and less area expensive then 
the Ring Oscillator PUF implementation. The results 
illustrated in Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, indicate that the 
hard macro in Spartan 6 has much more delay compared to 
Spartan 3E implementation. There are two factors which cause
this. The first one relates to the differences in FPGA Slice
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 architectures: in the case of Spartan 3E, the Slices have 2 
LUTs with 4 inputs each whereas in the case of Spartan 6, the 
Slices have 4 LUTs with 6 inputs each. The second factor 
relates to the requirement of balanced timing (equal 
propagation times) for interconnections leading to different 
routing and placement of logic gates inside the hard macro, as 
can be seen from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. In order to obtain minimum 
differences between the propagation times inside the hard 
macro, the delays are larger for Spartan 6, although the 
Spartan 6 FPGA families are faster. The differences inside 
PUF hard macros, obtained for different FPGA families, 
emphasize the randomness or uniqueness of PUF circuits in 
different FPGA families.  
Fig. 5a. Scenario 1 Ring Oscillator on Spartan 3E. 
Fig. 5b. Scenario 2 Ring Oscillator / Latch PUF on Spartan 3E. 
Fig. 6. Case 2: Complex IP core 
instance + PUF instances. 
Fig. 7. Case 3: Embedded 
System + PUF instances. 
B. Results of Standalone PUF ID design on FPGA device 
Considering the sequences of unique identifiers based on 
PUFs, it may be said that two important properties are: 
uniqueness and reproducibility. One possible measure of 
uniqueness, which is provided in most experimental results, is 
the inter-Hamming distance histogram, summarized by its 
average value. The reproducibility property is clear from its 
description. The responses to different evaluations of the same 
challenge x on the same PUF should be closed in the 
considered distance metric. For experimental results, this is 
mostly measured by the intra- Hamming distance histogram 
and summarized by its average value. From the statistical 
point of view, the FPGA population, including all the Spartan 
3E XC3S500 devices, is defined. Computing parameters about 
FPGA population are desired but there is no access to all 
devices around the world. So a sample of the population is 
considered: 30 FPGA available devices.  
Fig. 8 presents the inter- Hamming distance histogram for 
case III.B.1 using 128 ring oscillator PUFs. Fig. 9 shows the 
inter- Hamming distance histogram for case III.B.1 using 77 
latch based PUF. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 illustrate the inter- 
Hamming distance histogram for case III.B.2 using 4 of the 32 
length unique identifiers generated using ring oscillator PUF 
respectively latch based PUF. All figures show that the inter-
Hamming distance histogram has a normal distribution. 
Considering the definition of Central Limit Theorem, the 
mean and the standard deviation of all samples from the same 
population will be approximately equal to the mean and 
standard deviation of the population. Fig. 8, 9, 10 and 11 show 
the inter-chip Hamming distance measured between two 
different ID sequences in both cases A and B. The inter-
Hamming distance must be approx. 50% of different bits of 
their total number. Fig. 12 and 13 show the Hamming distance 
between two identification sequences generated under the 
same conditions. The intra-Hamming distance must be about 
10% unreliable bits from their total number.  
The inter-Hamming distance results show that the FPGA 
could be identified using these sequences. Moreover, Fig. 10 
and Fig. 11 show that there may be distinct IDs on the same 
FPGA meaning that there may be IDs or IP cores for each 
domain. This will allow it to implement the security protocol 
where IP cores are divided into different security level 
domains and each domain will receive a different ID.   
The intra- Hamming distance results show that there are a 
few unreliable bits (unstable bits) from one running to another 
and they may be detected and corrected using error-correcting 
codes, like BCH. The experiments in conditions of 
temperature variation show that there are maximum 8 
unreliable bits in case of 128 Ring Oscillator PUFs and 
maximum 5 unreliable bits in case of 77 Latch based PUFs.  
In case of integrated circuits, ASICs or FPGAs, the process 
of aging affects the same physical parameters as process 
variations: negative bias temperature instability, hot carrier 
injection, oxide breakdown, electro migration. Moreover, the 
aging effects are similar with temperature and voltage 
variations. The problem with the irreversible aging process of 
integrated circuits is that it may affect the reliability of the 
PUF responses. The practical experiments carried out, which 
are presented in this paper, show that the aging may not be 
seen as a reliability problem due to following reasons: i) The 
implementation of the ring oscillator PUF was performed at 
the end of 2012, wheares the implementation of the Latch PUF 
was carried out at the beginning of 2014. Since then, the PUFs 
were measured and analyzed several times on different 
scenarios and the reliability was the same – maximum 8 % of 
unreliable bits from the total number of PUF responses that 
was considered; ii) The FPGAs used in those experiments are 
Spartan 3E and Spartan 6. The Spartan 3E boards were 
purchased in 2004 and since then they were used frequently in 
student laboratories or home work projects. Despite the fact 
that these boards have been used intensively for more than 10 
years, the results of PUF properties are satisfactory; iii) based 
on the idea that aging is employed in constructing a PUF [22], 
the analysis in this paper shows that the aging process may 
increase the randomness and implicitly also the uniqueness of 
PUF responses. In case of a large number of unreliable bits, 
Slice_
X12Y8
XC3S500E
128 PUF 
circuits
Slice_
X26Y70
ChipScope
ILA 
Analyzer
Slice_
X28Y8
XC3S500E
128 PUF 
circuits
Slice_
X42Y70
ChipScope
ILA 
Analyzer
Slice_
X44Y8
XC3S500E
128 PUF 
circuits
Slice_
X58Y70
ChipScope
ILA 
Analyzer
ChipScope
ILA 
Analyzer
32 PUFs-
ID1
32 PUFs-
ID2
32 PUFs-
ID3
32 PUFs-
ID4
X10 X14 X18X22 X26X30
Inst_TFT_ctrl
Inst_Touch_ctrl
Inst_SysCon
X10 X14 X18X22 X26X30
Micro-
blaze
BRAM
Gpio Led Gpio Sw
the PUF based identification scheme may be regenerated. 
Moreover, for the application introduced in the present paper, 
a large value of unreliability will increase the security of the 
mechanism. The encryption between peripherals may be based 
on a pseudorandom generator started with a PUF based binary 
sequence. 
According to the experimental results, the validation of the 
use of the ring oscillators PUF or latch based PUF to generate 
a unique identifier for FPGA devices has succeed.  
Fig. 8. Inter-Distance Histogram 128 Ring Oscillator:        , 
      . 
Fig. 9. Inter-Distance Histogram 77 Latch based        ,       . 
Fig. 10. Inter-Distance Histogram 4 id Ring Oscillator PUF:  
     ,      . 
Fig. 11. Inter-Distance Histogram 4 id Latch PUF:        ,       . 
Fig. 12. Intra –Distance Histogram 128 Ring Oscillator PUF. 
Fig. 13. Intra-Distance Histogram 77 Latch Based PUF. 
C. Results of PUF ID design in combination with RTL 
complex system or System on Chip on FPGA devices 
The results regarding how the circuit activity influences the 
two PUF properties are presented considering the three 
scenarios described in Section III.C. In the first scenario, only 
24 PUF instances are taken into consideration, based on Ring 
Oscillator.  For the three scenarios, the results are satisfactory: 
in both cases there are related values for PUF answers and 
there are a maximum of 4 unreliable bits (unstable bits), which 
can be corrected using an error correction code. When the 
PUF outputs are measured without count instances, the entire 
design is re-synthesized, which may explain the different 
position of unreliable bits between the three cases. Another 24 
PUF circuits are instantiated near the previous one. Also, in 
this case, all situations mentioned above are analyzed. The 
results are related with the previous ones; the 4-5 different bits 
could be corrected using error correcting codes.  
Secondly the ring oscillator PUF instances are replaced with 
latch-based PUF instances and also increase the number of 
latch-based PUF instances. The locations and the first scenario 
presented in Section III.C are maintained.  
The results are presented in Fig. 14 including the following 
7 cases: i) PUF instances without binary counter instances, ii) 
PUF instances without binary counter instances after re-
synthesis iii) PUF instances without binary counter instances 
after another re-synthesis iv) PUF instances with a binary 
counter instance on each row v) PUF instances with three 
binary counter instances on each row vi) PUF instances with 
more binary counter instances vii) PUF instances with 
maximum number of binary sequences which fit the FPGA 
hardware resources. 
In the second scenario, the design was synthesized for two 
times and the ring oscillator PUF instances were placed and 
routed identical with the ones used in the first scenario. The 
PUF outputs with and without the complex VHDL design are 
measured. The first remark is that, even if the ring oscillator 
PUF instances have the same placement and routing, the ID 
values are different in the two scenarios. 
This may be explained considering the following 
assumptions: i) the PUF instances are collected using the logic 
analyzer ChipScope Pro Analyzer and that could influence the 
fan out of the digital gate contained in the PUF instances; ii) 
the counters and the comparators used to compute the PUF 
instances are placed differently by the Xilinx synthesis tool in 
the two scenarios and this influences the fan out; iii) the circuit 
activity influences the PUF responses through temperature 
variations. To limit the effects of the fan out on the gate 
propagation delays, a flip-flop circuit is placed on the ring 
oscillator output and the flip-flop output is connected to the 
logic analyzer or to the counters and comparators. Considering 
these, it can be said that the digital circuit activity influences 
the PUF responses in the first two scenarios.  
In case of the Latch based PUFs the conclusions are the 
same as in the ring oscillator case. Fig. 15 presents the results 
regarding the unreliable bits for ring oscillator PUF and Latch 
based PUF with the following two cases: i) PUF instances 
without complex RTL design, ii) PUF instances with complex 
RTL design.  
The third scenario considers a system design build around 
the Microblaze microprocessor which runs a simple C 
program which copies the values from the switch buttons to 
the leds. The results are presented in Fig. 16 considering the 
two cases: i) PUF instances without SoC implementation ii) 
PUF instances with SoC implementation.  
The PUF responses have been measured since the PUF 
implementations were in the final version (the end of 2012 for 
the ring oscillator; the beginning of 2014 for the latch based 
PUF). Each time the measurements were performed, the 
reliability property had the same value; less than 8% of the 
bits from the total number of generated PUF responses are 
unreliable. Each time the measurements were performed, 
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around 10 collected results were taken into account. During 
the last 2-3 years, the PUF results were carefully monitored 
several times and the uniqueness and reliability properties 
were successfully achieved every time. The final measurement 
lasted 3 weeks, while the PUF responses were collected and 
monitored. The results obtained were successful, as in the 
previous cases.   
Fig. 14. Scenario 1 Number of Unreliable Bits. 
Fig. 15. Scenario 2 Number of 
Unreliable Bits. 
Fig. 16. Scenario 3 Number of 
Unreliable Bits. 
Theoretically, the responses of the PUF circuits have the 
same value, whether the instances are placed on different 
FPGAs or on the same FPGA but in different locations. 
Practically, there will be differences between the responses of 
PUF circuits due to process variations. These are produced by 
physical imperfections that may arise during the execution 
phase of the integrated circuits, as the manufacturing process 
produces involuntary deviations of physical parameters from 
the normal values. Changes in these parameters cause 
electrical parameters to vary, such as sheet resistance and 
threshold voltage. Section III.A contains details regarding 
where and how the process variations are emphasized by the 
PUF circuits. Changes in electrical parameters affect the 
switching speed of digital signals, the temperature or voltage 
variations produced by the circuit activity, the power supply 
noise, the propagation time through digital gates or 
interconnections introducing random jitter. The entire FPGA 
surface, and, as a consequence also the entire digital design 
implemented on FPGA are affected by process variations. As 
it was shown in the scenarios described and implemented 
within this paper, although these variations in temperature, 
voltage and delays are small enough not to alter the normal 
circuit behavior (their values are included in the worst case 
scenario provided by the synthesis tool), they are significant 
for PUF circuits.  
According to the experimental results presented in Fig. 12, 
Fig. 13, Fig. 14, Fig. 15 and Fig. 16, there is an 8% total 
number of few unreliable bits from the total number of 
instantiated PUF circuits. For a sequence of PUF answers, 
which can be used as a cryptographic key for FPGA devices, it 
is important that the number of unreliable bits is convenient 
and could be corrected in order to obtain the same key on each 
situation. The number of accepted errors that may be corrected 
with an error correction and detection algorithm is maximum 
10% of the identifier length [1]. Examples of error correction 
and detection algorithms are BCH (Bose, Ray-Chaudhuri, 
Hocquenghem) and Reed-Solomon codes.  The mathematical 
theory and the hardware implementation of the error detection 
and correction BCH algorithm are discussed in [4]. For 
example, regeneration of a cryptographic key based on 128 
Ring Oscillator PUFs has two stages: 1) the generation of a 
helper data and 2) the regeneration phase. The first phase is 
used only once (or each time the FPGA is powered up) for a 
cryptographic key. It generates the 128-bits length identifier 
(cryptographic key) based on Ring Oscillators. From this 128-
bits length sequence, a helper data set is generated, which will 
be used each time for regeneration. The second phase involves 
the reconstruction of the identification sequence.  
In the case of FPGA devices, it is not mandatory to store the 
helper data in non-volatile memory. Such data may be stored 
in LUT registers or BRAM memories available on the 
programmable device. Erasing the stored data after losing the 
power supply voltage is not an inconvenient in case of FPGA 
devices. The authentication phase may be executed after each 
power up. There are two advantages in this case. The first one 
is that storing the helper data on FPGA hardware resources 
will increase the difficulty of a recovery attack and will affect 
the PUF responses (any attempt to read the value of helper 
data means direct contact with the physical device, which will 
lead to PUF responses modifications). Obtaining helper data 
capable of correcting maximum 10% of total number of bits 
will not help to obtain the PUF secret key and this is also the 
case when the storage is a non-volatile memory. The second 
advantage is related to unreliable bits and aging of integrated 
circuits. The execution of the authentication phase will 
occasionally eliminate the unpleasant effects of increasing the 
number of unreliable bits, in case such effects exist. 
Moreover, this paper introduces two weak PUFs (the number 
of challenges the PUF can accept is very limited) for using 
them in secure key generation. The machine learning attacks 
reported in literature are mostly convenient to strong PUFs 
(with a large number of challenge-response pairs, such as 
Arbiter PUF). No generic manipulation of helper data have 
been published so far [24]. The malicious modification of 
helper data will lead to PUF responses alterations or even chip 
destructions. Moreover, there may be cases in which the 
modification of helper data will generate a modified PUF 
based key that may be used forward in secure key generation, 
since the PUF key value has not been disclosed.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Conceptual design and implementation details of two PUF 
circuits, which are reliable for FPGA security methods, are 
presented. The use of the ring oscillators PUF and latch based 
PUF to generate a unique identifier for FPGA devices are 
validated through implementation and the experimental results 
presented on Section IV. The experiments were performed on 
two FPGA families. Section IV shows that the on-chip 
temperature variations contribute to the uniqueness property 
and does not affect the reproducibility property.  
Even if the circuit design influences the PUF answers, the 
number of unreliable bits is small enough to be corrected 
using an algorithm for error correcting codes. It has been 
shown that the circuit activity contributes to the uniqueness of 
the ID generated using PUFs: for different designs on the 
same FPGA chip, the ID will be slowly different due to 
temperature variations produced by internal activity. The 
security application introduced in Section II may use a pseudo 
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random generator based on PUF cryptographic key. In this 
case, the unreliable bits will increase the security strength of 
the mechanism. Environmental variations generated by circuit 
activity are also distinct from chip to chip due to process 
variations. These environmental variations could increase the 
random level of the PUF answers and not their unreliability. 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that distinct IDs on the 
same FPGA and distinct IDs for each domain or IP cores may 
exists on the same device. This will allow the implementation 
of the security protocol where IP cores are divided into 
different security level domains and each domain will receive 
a different ID.   
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